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Notes and Comments




Insurance is a prolific area of the law in terms of litigation. Many
more judgments have been handed down in Nova Scotia recently
than could be reviewed profitably in an article of reasonable length.
In an attempt to review a representative sample of the range of
insurance problems currently occupying Nova Scotia courts, Part II
of this article deals with a variety of cases arranged under six
headings. The topics represented have been chosen by reason of
their recurrent enduring importance in insurance law, as with
"insurable interest", by reason of current importance to the legal
profession, as with "limitation periods", or by reason of intriguing
new developments, as with "subrogation".
Part III focuses at some length on automobile insurance. Several
of the most important recent Nova Scotia cases have been in this
area, and two of the most important automobile insurance cases in
Canada have been Nova Scotia cases.
Part III also exposes some of the problems which presently beset
our automobile liability insurance code, and this theme is developed
in Part V.
Legislative developments in the area of insurance law are
canvassed in Part IV which also serves to introduce some of the
matters explored in Part V.
Most of the cases discussed are judgments of the Nova Scotia
courts but several Supreme Court of Canada judgments of
considerable importance are included. A couple of Ontario cases,
including a County Court judgment, are also included because of
the new directions they appear to be taking, directions which could
be of very real concern if followed in Nova Scotia.
Finally, it should be noted that in this article, "recent" means,
roughly, within the past four years. Most of the cases are judgments
delivered since the beginning of 1975, but I have occasionally cast
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my net wider to retrieve important earlier cases. This seemed
reasonable in view of the fact that insurance law was not surveyed in
the last special issue of this journal.
II. Insurance Case Law Generally
1. Accident
Probably no other word has generated more insurance litigation than
has "accident". The cases determining whether loss or damage has
been "caused by accident" or whether death was "accidental" are
fascinating, sometimes confused, and seemingly numberless.
A recent judgment by Macintosh J. in Veinot v. The Maritime
Life Assurance Company' applied the now well-established
principle that the injury victim cannot claim that his loss was
"accidental" if he has "deliberately courted the risk" or if his
"reckless conduct" has provoked the action which caused the loss.
The holding is not remarkable, but the case is worth reading as an
illustration of the endless kaleidoscope of human affairs which may
give rise to the issue and, more importantly, as an example of the
difference between intentional exposure to the risk and deliberate
courting of the risk.
Barry Veinot had pursued his estranged wife, Corinne, and his
brother, Charles, at high speed over slippery roads. Arriving at the
home which Corinne and Charles were visiting, Barry forced his
way in despite obstruction by the homeowner. During the
altercation at the door, Charles Veinot had loaded a shotgun and
warned Barry to leave. There was some conflict of evidence, but the
Court accepted the view that Barry Veinot moved toward his brother
who then fired the gun inflicting such serious injury that the
plaintiff's right leg was later amputated.
The plaintiff claimed under a policy which agreed to compensate
him for "bodily injury sustained accidentally".
MacIntosh J. relied on two cases, Travellers Insurance Co. v.
Elder2 and Trynor Construction Company Ltd. v. The Canadian
Surety Company3.
In the Elder case the insured authored his own misfortune very
much like Barry Veinot. When he tried to help himself to another
1. (1976), 22N.S.R. (2d) 84 (S.C., T.D.)
2. [194012 D.L.R. 444; 68 Que. K.B. 335 (C.A.)
3. (1970), 1 N.S.R. (2d) 599; 10 D.L.R. (3d) 482; [1970] I.L.R. 1-356
(S.C.,A.D.)
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pickle and used abusive language toward a restaurant employee the
latter threw a glass tumbler at his face. His injury was held not to be
accidental.
In Trynor the insured's truck was damaged when a bridge
collapsed under the truck and a bulldozer which it was carrying. The
insured's employees had stopped and tried to assess the capacity of
the bridge to carry the load. Thus, they were aware of the risk and
took a deliberate decision to attempt to cross the bridge. The loss
was found to be "accidental" in that the insured's employees had
exercised their best judgment.
Veinot confirms, as did Trynor, that in distinguishing "accident"
from "deliberate courting of the risk" the degree of recklessness in
the insured's conduct will be of critical importance.
"Accident" was also at issue, but in a more unusual context, in
Pickford & Black Ltd. v. Canadian General Insurance Co.. 4 In this
case a stevedoring firm, Pickford & Black Limited, were insured
against liability for damage to property "resulting solely and
directly from an accident due to the operations of the Insured". The
policy contained an exclusion in respect of "Accident occurring
outside the Dominion of Canada and the United States of
America".
Pickford & Black loaded some heavy electrical equipment
belonging to Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. aboard a ship in
Halifax harbour. After a day at sea, and at a time when the ship was
outside the territorial limits of Canada and the United States, the
cargo shifted and the electrical equipment was damaged. It was
established that the cause of the cargo shifting was negligence in
stowing the electrical equipment, and Pickford & Black was liable
to Canadian General Electric for the damage. 5
Canadian General Insurance Co. denied that this liability was
covered by its policy. At the trial6 before Dubinsky J. it was argued
for the insured that the "accident" was the negligent act of
stowage, and not the shifting of cargo which resulted; thus, the
"accident" took place in Halifax harbour. Dubinsky J. rejected this
argument and agreed with the insurer's argument that the only event
4. [1977] 1 S.C.R. 261; 14 N.S.R. (2d) 181; 64 D.L.R. (3d) 179; [1976] I.L.R.
1-732
5. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. v. Pickford & Black Ltd., [1971] S.C.R.
41; 2 N.S.R. (2d) 497; 14 D.L.R. (3d) 372
6. (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 517; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 360; [1974] I.L.R. 1-610 (S.C.,
T.D.)
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or occurrence which could be described as "accidental" was the
cargo shifting at sea.
However, Dubinsky J. gave judgment for the plaintiff on two
grounds. First, he thought the exclusion clause did not apply to the
policy endorsement under which the insured was claiming.
Secondly, the "accident" could not be considered by itself but must
be viewed in conjunction with the chain of causation leading to the
"accident"; here that chain of causation led back to Halifax
harbour.
This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal; 7 an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed. 8 Both appellate courts
held that the exclusion did govern the endorsement under which the
insured claimed and that the "accident" which was the shifting of
cargo, took place at sea. Dubinsky J.'s view was rejected as
involving a reading of "occurred" as though it said "originated".
So far as the definition of "accident" and the fixing of the place
where it "occurred" is concerned the ultimate result in this case is
probably unremarkable. But the case bears further discussion as an
illustration of insurance contract formation practices which have so
often produced litigation and which apparently will continue to do
SO.
The policy issued to Pickford & Black, entitled a "contractors
public liability policy", was in fact designed to insure the
company's liability "for damages because of bodily injury, sickness
or disease . . . caused by accident . . . and resulting from or while
at or about the work or operations of the Insured. . .". The property
damage liability cover was added to the policy by endorsement.
Dubinsky J. thought that the exclusion in respect of accidents
outside Canada and the United States was inappropriate as applied
to this endorsement and did not operate to cut down the cover given
by the endorsement.
The way in which such policies are developed and the interpretive
difficulties to which they give rise are well stated in these extracts
from the decision of MacKeigan C.J.N.S., in the Court of Appeal
judgment in Pickford and Black:
The insurance policy to be interpreted is the common
7. (1975), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 501; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 277; [1976] I.L.R. 1-720 (S.C.,
A.D.)
8. [1977] 1 S.C.R. 261; 14 N.S.R. (2d) 181; 64 D.L.R. (3d) 179; [1976] I.L.R.
1-732
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hodge-podge of forms, conditions and added endorsements,
selected without careful regard for the purpose intended. .. .
.... The policy is no gem of draftsmanship..... It is apparent
that the underwriter took a printed form of contractor's public
liability policy and adapted it as best he could to cover liability
for both personal injury and property damage resulting from
accidents due to the respondent's stevedoring operations at
Halifax. The policy must be reasonably construed as a whole, to
determine what the parties intended . . ..
Even when its component parts are so diverse in their origin, and
so awkward in their merger, it no doubt remains a correct guide to
interpretation to try to construe the policy as a whole. However, it is
surely increasingly euphemistic to speak of "what the parties
intended" when, plainly, they gave no real thought to the exact
nature of the risk being underwritten or to the effect on the risk
intended to be covered of adding bits and pieces from a stockpile of
various forms.
2. Insurable Interest
Although the courts have at times criticized insurable interest as a
mean defence for an insurer the flow of cases in which insurable
interest is argued continues unabated.
In Sellers v. Continental Insurance Co. 11 the insured, Ralph
Sellers, had built his home on a piece of land title to which was held
by Canso Concrete Products Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Canso Excavators Limited, which was wholly owned by Sellers. In
a transaction to finance the companies, the shares of Canso
Excavators Limited were sold to Northside Freight Handlers
Limited; the agreement for sale of the shares included a clause
reciting that the house built on the land owned by Canso Concrete
Products Limited belonged to Ralph Sellers. In the same clause
Northside agreed to vote its shares of Canso Excavators and Canso
Concrete Products so as to provide Sellers an opportunity to
purchase the land on which the house stood, to a limit of four acres.
The house and contents were destroyed by a fire in which Sellers
died. Continental Insurance Co. defended an action on the policy on
9. (1975), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 501 at 505; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 277 at 280; [1976] I.L.R.
1-720 at 2484 (S.C., A.D.)
10. Id. at 512; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 285; [1976] I.L.R. at 2488
11. (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 369; [1975] I.L.R. 1-657 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
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two grounds, first, that Sellers had no insurable interest in the house
or contents, and second, that his interest was not as owner and his
true interest was not stated in the policy. This defence, of course, is
based on Statutory Condition #2 of the Fire Part of the Insurance
Act. 12
Cowan C.J.T.D. held that Sellers had an insurable interest in the
house either on the basis that he had constructed it with his own
money, though admittedly on land he did not own, or on the basis of
his agreement with Northside pursuant to which he could purchase
the land. Cowan C.J. also found that Sellers was interested in the
house as "owner" so that there was no breach of Statutory
Condition #2. The evidence of Sellers' purchase and ownership of
the household furnishings seems to have been quite clear, and one
wonders that the insurer would raise a defence seemingly so
vexatious. As to the house, the argument of lack of insurable
interest had considerable plausibility although the objection was
purely technical as there is nothing in the case to suggest that what
the insurer was really complaining of was misrepresentation or
arson.
The fact, of course, is that the defence of lack of insurable
interest is usually a technical defence and is frequently resorted to in
order to mask objections more substantial but perhaps impossible to
establish.
Cowan C. J.'s disposition of Sellers, and particularly the broad
definition given "owner" and the slight attention paid to Statutory
Condition #2, is to be contrasted with the Ontario case, Marks v.
Commonwealth Insurance Co. 13. In that case Mrs. Celia Marks was
the registered owner of a residential property insured with
Commonwealth Insurance Co. and purportedly rented to a tenant,
Clarence Ross, through her agent, Herman Airst. Prior to the fire
which destroyed the house, Clarence Ross had entered into an
agreement with Isaac Airst to purchase the property from him.
Isaac Airst was Celia Marks' husband and Herman Airst was his
brother.
The evidence at trial was confused and unreliable and left doubt
whether Mrs. Marks was owner of the house, nominal owner and
trustee for the Airst brothers, mortgagee, or whether she had any
capacity recognized in law.
12. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148
13. (1974), 20.R. (2d) 237; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 481; [1974] I.L.R. 1-580 affg [1972]
I.L.R. 1-484 (C.A.)
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The trial judge, Galligan J., held that Mrs. Marks was "purely a
nominal owner and had no beneficial interest in the property" and
thus had no insurable interest. The Court of Appeal agreed that the
fact of being a "nominal owner" did not create an interest in the
property.
The Court of Appeal also relied on Statutory Condition #2 of the
Ontario Insurance Act 14 which is in the same language as the Nova
Scotia Statutory Condition:
2. Unless otherwise specifically stated in the contract the insurer
is not liable for loss or damage to property owned by any person
other than the insured, unless the interest of the insured therein is
stated in the contract.
Evans J.A. said "The proper test. . . is not whether the appellant
is the owner but whether the property is owned by others."
This case created something of a stir concerning the doubt cast on
a bare trustee's right to insure, and the narrowing of the term
"owner" to mean beneficial ownership.' 5 The reaction to Marks
may have been misplaced. As one commentator conceded,
• . . uncertainty, on the part of the insurer, as to whether the
insured or some other person is the owner of the property, is most
material to the risk. In this view, the insurer may merely want to
be informed at the outset that the insured, named in the contract
of insurance, is holding the property in trust, for the benefit of
others. 16
This passage appears to correctly state the function of Statutory
Condition #2, and also to provide the rationalization for the
superficially different results in Marks and in Sellers. The insurer's
primary interest is in having a full disclosure of the extent of the
named insured's interest, and the identity of any other persons with
an interest. Both items of information obviously bear on the moral
hazard. In Sellers, although the insured did not have title to the land
under his home, he had the full financial stake in the house and the
judgment discloses no attempt by him to deceive the insurer. In
Marks it was doubtful whether the named insured had any stake in
the property, and the judgment records numerous deceptions by
Mrs. Marks of counsel examining her for discovery. Galligan J.
14. R.S.O. 1970, c. 224. Statutory Condition #2 is imported into the contract by
section 122. In the Nova Scotia Act the statutory condition is imported into the
contract by section 121
15. See, case comment by H. Kirsh, (1974), 52 Can. B. Rev. 305 and by G.
Brent, (1974), 52 Can.B.Rev. 604
16. H. Kirsh, (1974), 52Can.B.Rev. 305 at310
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found that the property was over-insured and that the value stated
was exaggerated. In short, although the defence of lack of insurable
interest may be unpopular, and is always in danger of being a
technical objection, Statutory Condition #2 seems to impose a
salutary obligation on the insured and the cases suggest that a
technical defence may sometimes do substantial justice.
Most of the concerns raised by Marks about the potentially
oppressive application of Statutory Condition #2 should have been
allayed by the later Supreme Court of Canada judgment in
Commerce & Industry Insurance Company of Canada v. West End
Investment Company. 17 West End sold a hotel to Hector Charette
and was owed a balance of the sale price exceeding $50,000.
Charette leased the building to Jeando Inc. and the latter undertook
to insure. Through the intermediation of a broker and two agents,
policies agreeing to pay to an aggregate limit of $50,000 were
issued by Commerce & Industry Insurance Company and several
other companies on a subscription basis. The policies described
Jeando Inc. as the insured and, in a clause purporting to relate to
mortgage creditors, named "1. Hector Charette; 2. West End
Investment Co.; as their interests may appear .... "
After loss, the insurers resisted a claim on the policy on two
grounds. First, it was said that Jeando Inc. had no insurable interest.
Secondly, the insurers relied on the following statutory condition:
10. The company is not liable for the losses following, that is to
say:
(a) For the loss of property owned by any other person than the
assured, unless the interest of the assured is stated in or upon
the policy; 18
The Supreme Court of Canada held that Jeando Inc. had an
insurable interest by reason of its undertaking in the lease to insure,
and also by reason of its potential liability as tenant for loss caused
by its negligence.
As to the defence based on the statutory condition, Pigeon J.
noted that an insurance contract can be concluded informally, even
orally, and that there is nothing to prevent an insurer from choosing
not to require an insured to mention the nature of his interest. He
then noted that the policies in question were issued, following a
standard practice, without obtaining a written application from the
insured.
17. (1976), 11 N.R. 541; [1976]I.L.R. 1-795 (S.C.C.)
18. From the Fire Part of the Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 295
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Thus, the insured was given no chance to provide the information
required by Statutory Condition #10(a) and, in the circumstances, a
defence based on the statutory condition was simply an attempt to
evade the insurer's obligation without showing prejudice.
Although this case came to the Supreme Court of Canada from
the Quebec Court of Appeal, Pigeon J. noted that Quebec's
Statutory Condition #10(a) was copied verbatim from an earlier
version of Ontario's statutory condition which now appears in
Ontario, Nova Scotia and other common law provinces as Statutory
Condition #2 in the form noted above in the discussion of Marks.
Pigeon J. also relied on two old Supreme Court of Canada cases
arising under the Ontario Act, and the Nova Scotia Act,
respectively. Thus, Commerce & Industry Insurance Company of
Canada v. West End Investment Company should be reliable
authority in Nova Scotia and should help to settle the meaning of
"insurable interest" and to define the proper role of Statutory
Condition #2 of the Fire Part of the Insurance Act.
The most disturbing insurable interest cases arise in connection
with automobile insurance. Cases like Wolfe v. Oliver1 9 and Stevens
v. Bowser 20 typify the all-too-common scenario in which one
person buys an automobile and procures its registration in the name
of another person who also insures the vehicle. In these cases a
successful defence of lack of insurable interest redounds to the
disadvantage not only of the vehicle owner, but also, more
unfortunately, of his innocent injury victim.
These cases are reviewed in Part IV of this survey where the
special problems arising under automobile insurance policies are
considered.
3. Limitation Period
As with the defence of insurable interest, insurers frequently take
advantage of a limitation period when their real reason for resisting
payment is substantive but hard to establish. It is notorious that
courts are loath to make a finding of arson, suicide or fraud. It is
also common knowledge that insurers react to this judicial tendency
by delaying tactics in cases in which arson, suicide or fraud is
suspected.
19. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 313; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 380; [1975] I.L.R. 1-644 (S.C.,
A.D.)
20. (1974), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 440 (S.C., T.D.)
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Webb Real Estate Ltd. v. Canadian Surety Co.21 provides an
excellent step-by-step account of the delaying tactics used,
successfully in that case, and serves as a chilling object lesson to
lawyers.
Webb Real Estate and a related company were insured against
loss by fire under two subscription policies undterwritten by a total
of thirteen insurance companies.
On June 1, 1973, the property covered by the policies was
destroyed by fire and on the same day the solicitor for Mr. Webb
(who owned both companies) took instructions and gave notice of
the loss to the adjuster for all thirteen insurers. Hart J.'s judgment
contains a four page summary of the correspondence, documents,
demands, references, return of unsatisfactory forms, and other
manoeuvers which ensued. A total of thirty-six proof of loss forms
was required, and the insured was pressed to great lengths to
comply with policy warranties concerning fire extinguishers and
lightning rods.
Throughout Hart J.'s judgment there is no overt hint of arson, but
one can't help remarking on the number and technical detail of the
objections and demands of the insurers. In fact, arson was suspected
and a police investigation was conducted. If Webb's solicitor was
unaware of this he was apparently one of the few such naive souls in
the town.
Two or three weeks after June 1, 1974, Webb's solicitor realized
that the one-year limitation period under the policies had elapsed.
These limitation periods were imported into the policies by the
following statutory condition:
14. Action - Every action or proceeding against the insurer for
the recovery of any claim under or by virtue of this contract shall
be absolutely barred unless commenced within one year next
after the loss or damage occurs. 
22
The plaintiff sought assistance under s. 25B of the Insurance
Act23 which gives the court discretion to relieve against forfeiture
consequent upon imperfect compliance with a statutory condition.
Following Bacon American Corporation v. Orion Insurance Co.
Ltd. 24 and an established line of cases in the Western provinces,
Hart J. held that s. 25B did not give him discretion to over-ride the
21. (1976), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 738; [1976] I.L.R. 1-760 (N.S.S.C.,T.D.)
22. Statutory Condition #14, Schedule to Part VII of the Insurance Act
23. Addedby S.N.S. 1966, c. 79, s.2
24. (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 75; [1966] I.L.R. 1-226 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
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clear limitation expressed in Statutory Condition #14.
The sad sequel to this case was a successful action against the
solicitor for professional negligence.
Thus, Webb Real Estate stands for, or gives rise ultimately to,
four cautions.
1st the court cannot relieve against the consequence of missing a
limitation period in the Insurance Act;
2nd missing a limitation period may amount to professional
negligence;
3rd as an obvious practical guide, a solicitor should be doubly
careful whenever there is a cloud on the insured's claim and the
insurer seems to be unusually demanding in its requirements and
slow in its processing of the claim;
4th the limitation period in Statutory Condition #14 of the Fire
Part of the Act is by no means the only such hazard for the unwary
lawyer.
Actions under accident and sickness insurance policies and under
auto insurance policies must be launched within one year.25 There
are less specific, but probably equally dangerous, time periods to be
observed as well. Any material change in the risk covered by an
automobile insurance or a fire insurance policy must be "promptly"
notified to the insurer. 26 Under an auto insurance policy the insured
must give notice of loss "promptly", 27 and under a fire insurance
policy notice of loss must be given "forthwith" .28 This is not a
comprehensive compilation of the time hazards lurking in the
Insurance Act. The message from Webb Real Estate is clear:
whenever you are dealing with insurance policies, do not delay, and
canvass the Act carefully.
4. Proof of Death
The fact of death is usually so incontrovertible and its time so
susceptible of determination to a high degree of accuracy that it is
easy to overlook the problems of proof facing a life insurance
beneficiary when the life insured has mysteriously disappeared.
A review of those problems is provided by Dubinsky J.'s
25. See Statutory Condition #12 under s. 58, and Statutory Condtion #6(3) in the
Schedule to Part VI of the Act
26. See, Statutory Condition #1(1) in the Schedule to Part VI, and Statutory
Condition #4 in the Schedule to Part VII of the Act
27. See, Statutory Condition #4(1) (a) in the Schedule to Part VI
28. See, Statutory Condition #6(1) (a) in the Schedule to Part VII
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judgment in Stanfield v. The Commercial Union Assurance
Company Limited. 2 9 The claimant must prove the death; there is no
presumption of death before the expiration of seven years from the
time the missing person was last seen or heard from; even when the
seven-years' absence presumption operates, there is no presumption
as to when, within the seven year period, death took place; if a
claim depends on death having occurred at a specific time within the
seven years, the onus of proof is on the claimant.
In the Stanfield case Paul Cyr had obtained a large policy on his
life in October, 1973. Calculating days of grace, the policy expired
February 16, 1974. Paul Cyr was last seen alive on February 4,
1974, when he left Louisburg in an unseaworthy vessel shortly
before a severe storm.
A claim on the policy was resisted. The insurer, opposing a
presumption of death, cited the fact of Cyr's criminal record and the
suspiciously fortuitous circumstances of the size and timeliness of
the insurance policy.
Dubinsky J. was convinced that the claimant had displaced the
burden of proof. There was evidence that Cyr was heading for
Newfoundland in a damaged boat in bad ice conditions and in a
storm; a very thorough police search for Cyr had failed to turn up
any evidence of his survival; despite his past criminal record, Cyr
had no reason to disappear; most persuasive of all, three other men,
none of whom had any reason to disappear, accompanied Cyr in the
boat and remained missing.
Stanfield happens to have been a case in which the insurance
beneficiary could marshall numerous facts and circumstances to
counterbalance the suspicions raised by the insurer. Many times
there will be less evidence available and the beneficiary will be hard
pressed to present such facts as will not "leave the scales in
equilibrium".
It was noted in Stanfield that the action was brought under section
168 of the Insurance Act, but neither that provision nor section 169
was discussed. Where a life insured has been missing for seven
years, section 169 authorizes an application, by either the insurer or
the claimant, to the Court for a presumption of death declaration. In
other circumstances, not involving absence for seven years, where
the only question in issue is the death of the life insured, section 168
authorizes an application by either the insurer or the claimant.
29. (1977), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 1, affd (1977), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 115 (S.C., A.D.)
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A review of the law reports will not suggest any activity by the
insurance companies so far as exercising their authority to apply for
a declaration is concerned. Given the obvious financial advantage
which follows from retention of the insurance proceeds, perhaps it
is unreasonable to expect insurance companies to enthusiastically
embrace an opportunity to apply to pay them out.
However, consider the situation which arises when the life
insured disappears leaving, let us assume, a wife and perhaps
children, often in rather impoverished circumstances. If the putative
widow seeks the insurance proceeds she finds that she will have to
establish her husband's death. If seven years have not elapsed, or if
her husband had good reason to disappear, her prospect is an
expensive legal proceeding with little expectation of obtaining the
required declaration.
Given the importance of life insurance to a man's survivors, an
importance which the industry itself finds useful to emphasize,
surely the Insurance Act should require the insurer to apply under
section 168 or section 169, as appropriate, for the declaration
enabling it safely to pay the proceeds to the beneficiary. Even this
change in the Act, which would at least assist those potential
claimants who are deterred by the cost and the hazards of litigation,
seems too modest. The economic advantage of holding the money
until death is proven is not a persuasive argument in favour of the
insurer. At present, the persuasive case for the insurer is that it
cannot safely pay out the insurance proceeds, without a court order,
lest the missing life insured should appear asking for the surrender
value of his policy. I suggest that the Insurance Act should be
amended to provide that, whenever it is established that the life
insured has disappeared for a period exceeding one year, the insurer
shall pay the insurance proceeds to the beneficiary. If the life
insured later appeared he would have no property rights and no
claim under the former policy. If subjected to appropriate
safeguards to control fraudulent disappearances and claims, this
change would greatly assist a small number of people who
desperately need assistance without significantly affecting the
underwriting risk of life insurers.
5. Statutory Conditions
A recent judgment of Hallett J., MacLean v. The Dominion
Insurance Corporation,30 involves several issues and concludes
30. (1977), N.S. unreported, S.P.H. No 00096
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with several holdings. It is of greatest interest as the most recent test
of a fire insurer's liberty to use a vacancy clause in the face of a
challenge to such clauses as being an impermissible variation of the
statutory conditions.
To fully appreciate the issue it is necessary to recall that until
1956 fire insurance policies were subject to the following statutory
condition:
5. RISKS NOT COVERED EXCEPT BY SPECIAL PERMIS-
SION - Unless permission is given by the policy or indorsed
thereon, the insurer shall not be liable for loss or damage
occurring:
(d) VACANCY - when the building insured or containing the
property insured is, to the knowledge of the insured, vacant
or unoccupied for more than thirty consecutive days .... 3"
At the same time, fire policies contained a further statutory
condition, identical to present Statutory Condition #4, avoiding the
policy for any material change in the risk not notified to the insurer.
In 1956 the common law provinces enacted a new uniform fire
insurance code simplifying and reducing the number of statutory
conditions. 32 Old Statutory Condition #5(d) regulating vacancy
was deleted. This left alternative inferences concerning the insurer's
liberty to control vacancy. Whereas formerly a vacancy clause
would clearly have covered the same ground as Statutory Condition
#5(d) and would have been struck down as a "variation, omission
or addition" to the statutory conditions, it was now arguable that
vacancy was a matter to be controlled by the contract and the insurer
could insert its own vacancy clause, perhaps more onerous than the
old 30 day clause.
The alternative argument was that vacancy should be treated as
but one of many possible material changes in the risk to be governed
by the new Statutory Condition #4 whose role would now be much
expanded.
These two arguments prevailed, in turn, in the Newfoundland
courts in Simon v. London & Scottish Assurance Corporation Ltd.
in which a house stood vacant for about six months before loss. The
insurer relied on an exclusion in respect of vacancy for more than 30
31. Statutory Condition #5(d) taken from the Schedule to the Fire Insurance
Policy Act, R.S.N.S. 1954, c. 100
32. See, S.N.S. 1956, c.6
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consecutive days, and also argued that there had been an unreported
material change in the risk.
At trial33 Mifflin J. held that it had not been proven that the
vacancy materially affected the risk. He also denied the defence
based on the exclusion clause on the ground that the attempted
exclusion was an impermissible variation of the statutory condition
governing material changes in the risk.
The Court of Appeal reversed on both grounds. 34 It held that the
vacancy clause could stand along with Statutory Condition #4 and
was not a prohibited attempt to vary that statutory condition.
Puddester J., Higgins J. concurring, also held that in the
circumstances of the case, there had been a material change in the
risk.
The facts in MacLean v. The Dominion Insurance Corporation
were very similar to Simon, and the result is consistent.
The insurance policy contained an exclusion in respect of,
(c) loss or damage caused while the building is to the
knowledge of the insured vacant for more than thirty (30)
consecutive days;
The building stood vacant from March until its destruction in
December. During this time it was broken into several times. The
insurance policy was renewed in September without any mention to
the insurer of the vacancy or the break-ins..
Hallett J. upheld the defence based on exclusion clause (c) which,
he held, was not offensive to s. 121 of the Act as a "variation or
omission of or addition to any statutory condition". The exclusion
clause, he said ". . . merely limits the risk which does not in any
way relate to the matters covered by the statutory conditions".
He also held that the conduct described amounted to an
unreported material change in the risk so that the insurer had a
defence under Statutory Condition #4.
This is undoubtedly an area of insurance law of great difficulty
and delicate distinctions. There appear to co-exist as separate, but
nearly indistinguishable concepts, conditions (both statutory and
consensual), exclusions, and restrictive definitions of the risk.
33. (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 180 (Nfld. S.C.)
34. [1969] I.L.R. 1-267 (Nfld. C.A.)
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In such an area it is perhaps somewhat graceless to quibble, but
one cannot resist noting the apparent logical incongruities in the
judgments of Puddester J. and Hallet J. How can it be said that an
exclusion clause is unrelated to the statutory conditions, and in the
next breath, that the conduct which offended the exclusion clause
also represented a breach of one of the statutory conditions?
If these were alternative holdings I would not cavil, but in both
cases they are presented, not in the alternative, but as holdings
which stand together.
Two other propositions from MacLean deserve mention. Relying
on remarks made in Simon by Puddester J. who, in turn, obtained
support from Nahayowski v. Pearl Assurance Company Limited, 3 5
Hallett J. asserted that the court may draw an inference of a material
change in the risk, by reason of vacancy of a building in a remote
area, without requiring the insurer to give expert evidence on the
question what does amount to a material change in the risk. In view
of the several break-ins this inference was amply justified on the
evidence presented to Hallett J. Fortunately, he made it plain that he
was drawing his inference from the evidence and was not
establishing a general proposition that vacancy, even in a remote
area, is presumed to be a material change in the risk unless the
insured refutes the presumption.
Hallett J. also held that by renewing his policy in September
without mentioning the vacancy or the break-ins, the insured was in
breach of his disclosure duty under Statutory Condition #1. This,
he said, was "an omission to communicate a circumstance that is
material to be made known to the insurer .... ,,36
It is noticeable that although he characterized the insured's
default as a non-disclosure rather than a misrepresentation, his
Lordship avoided using the word "fraud". Statutory Condition #1
speaks of any person who " . . . misrepresents or fraudulently
omits to communicate any circumstance which is material . . .-37
and Taylor v. The London Assurance Corporation3 s confirms that
fraud must be shown in order to avoid a fire insurance policy on the
basis of non-disclosure. Presumably, Hallett J. found fraud but did
not say "fraud".
35. (1964),45 W.W.R. 662 (Alta. S.C., T.D.)
36. Emphasis added by Hallett J.
37. See, Statutory Condition #1 in the Schedule to Part VII of the Act
38. [19351 S.C.R. 422; [193513 D.L.R. 129; 2 I.L.R. 252
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6. Subrogation
Like insurable interest, subrogation is a basic insurance principle
with a high capacity to generate litigation and a large tendency for
abuse. The most serious abuses of the concept have come through
legislative tinkering rather than through the judicial process.
In respect of automobile insurance and fire insurance policies,
section 100M and section 128, respectively, of the Insurance Act
have eroded some of the primary characteristics that made
subrogation such a finely-balanced equitable tool for adjusting the
respective rights and obligations of insurer, insured and third party
obligee.
Although s. 100M wrought some other changes in the subrogation
rights under an automobile insurance policy, the simplest, and most
serious, change it shares with section 128; both sections breach the
fundamental notion that the insured is to be fully indemnified as a
first priority and only after that has been achieved does subrogation
operate to throw the benefit of any excess recovery on the insurer.
Both section 100M(2) and section 128(2) alter this fundamental
notion expressly and indisputably. However, the legislatures began
to proliferate statutory subrogation mutations whose characteristics
were not entirely plain. They were clearly not the common law (or
rather, equitable) breed, but the extent of their deviation from the
common law model was in some respects debatable.
Thus, the most significant, and most salutary, judgment in this
area in recent years was the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in
Ledingham v. Ontario Hospital Services Commission39 which
reaffirmed a full indemnity for the insured as a first priority and a
basic assumption in all subrogation situations except where
expressly varied by statute. That case involved competing claims,
against an inadequate Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, by the
injury victims and by the Ontario Hospital Services Commission.
The argument for the Commission was that its statute-based
subrogation right allowed it to participate pro rata with the injury
victim in any third party recovery. This was not plainly stated in the
Hospital Services Commission Act, but was an inference based on
other features of the statutory subrogation creature. In affirming that
full indemnity for the insured is a basic assumption of all
subrogation provisions, statutory or otherwise, the Supreme Court
of Canada confirmed the position taken by Cowan C.J.T.D. when
39. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 332; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 699
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the same question arose under the Nova Scotia Hospital Insurance
Act in MacDonald v. Parrish.40 Fortunately, the new Health
Services and Insurance Act 4 ' attempts, in section 13(9), to give a
solid statutory endorsement to this important safeguard for the
insured. Unfortunately, section 13(9) is somewhat infelicitously
phrased and, in the result, does not confirm the insured's prior claim
to a full indemnity as clearly as one would like.
42
The subrogation problem becomes particularly acute when the
third party who has caused the loss stands in some close relationship
to the insured and claims to be an insured under the same policy.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently dealt with three cases of
this nature, Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd. v. Cummer-Yonge
Investments Ltd. ,43 Ross Southward Tire Ltd. v. Pyrotech Products
Ltd. ,44 and Commonwealth Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil
Ltd. 45
The Agnew-Surpass company was the tenant of premises on a
shopping plaza. Its lease contained three notable features. The
tenant agreed to make repairs except for reasonable wear and tear
and except for damage caused by perils against which the lessor was
obligated to insure. The standard form language obliging the tenant
to insure was deleted in pencil. Thirdly, the lessor convenanted to
insure against "all risk of loss or damage caused by or resulting
from fire".
The lessor obtained a policy of fire insurance which covered loss
of business rentals as well as damage to the building.
Through the tenant's negligence, a fire started in its premises and
spread to other stores in the plaza. The insurer paid $208,000 for
damage to the building and $25,000 for lost rentals, and claimed to
recover the full $233,000 from Agnew-Surpass by way of
subrogation. Agnew-Surpass argued that it had been exonerated by
the lease from all liability. The Supreme Court of Canada split three
ways. Two judges considered that the lease did not exonerate the
tenant who, accordingly, got no benefit of the insurance policy.
40. (1972), 24D.L.R. (3d) 467 (N.S.S.C.,T.D.)
41. S.N.S. 1973, c. 8
42. See the discussion in J. Rendall, Subrogation in Medical and Hospital
Insurance Schemes: Judicial Philosophy Versus Legislative Pragmatism (1974), 6
Ottawa L.R. 291 at 320-22
43. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 221; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 676; ( 1975] I.L.R. 1-675
44. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 35; 57 D.L.R. (3d) 248; [1975] I.L.R. 1-691
45. (1976), 69D.L.R. (3d) 558; [1976] I.L.R. 1-804(S.C.C.)
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Three judges found that the lease fully exonerated the tenant who,
therefore, obtained the full benefit of the insurance. Four judges
held that the lease exonerated the tenant in respect of the damage to
the building but not in respect of the lost rentals. In the result, the
insurer was able to recover from Agnew-Surpass the $25,000 paid
for lost rentals.
In the Pyrotech case, Pyrotech Products was tenant under a lease
which did not specifically oblige the landlord to insure but which
did impose on the tenant the cost of property taxes, power and water
rates, and insurance rates. The landlord insured with Aetna
Insurance Company, the policy apparently making no mention of
Pyrotech. The latter company was unaware of the nature of the
policy taken out by the landlord, but paid over, as requested, that
part of the insurance cost referable to the fire cover. Pyrotech had its
own policy of insurance with the Maryland Casualty Company
covering Pyrotech's liability as a tenant. This policy had been taken
out by Pyrotech when the company occupied different premises and
was transferred by the insurer to relate to the new premises "as a
matter of course".
The landlord's building was destroyed by a fire caused by
Pyrotech's negligence. Aetna paid for the loss and claimed to be
subrogated. It will be seen that the dispute was really between the
two insurers.
By a 3-2 majority the Supreme Court of Canada held that, though
the lease did not expressly exonerate the tenant from liability for its
negligence, the agreement to pay for fire insurance protection gave
it the benefit of the fire insurance cover in Aetna's policy. Although
the tenant might remain liable for loss caused in other ways, it
should have the benefit of the insurance for which it had paid.
In the third case Imperial Oil was constructing a fertilizer plant.
The head contractor was Wellman-Lord (Alberta) Ltd. and
Commonwealth Construction was a subcontractor to install piping.
Imperial Oil obtained a multi-peril subscription policy in which the
insured was named as follows:
"IMPERIAL OIL LIMITED AND ITS SUBSIDIARY COM-
PANIES AND ANY SUBSIDIARIES THEREOF AND ANY
OF THEIR CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS".
A fire, caused by Commonwealth did $305 worth of damage to
property of Commonwealth and $103,000 damage to the rest of the
project. The entire loss was paid and a subrogation claim made
against Commonwealth for all but the $305. The insurers,
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obviously, were arguing that Commonwealth had an interest limited
to its own property.
The interrelation of insurable interest and subrogation is nicely
illustrated in this case. For the Court, de Grandpr6 J. separated the
case into two issues. First, in addition to its obvious interest in its
own work, did Commonwealth have an insurable interest in the
entire project so that subrogation was ruled out by basic principles?
Secondly, if not, was subrogation nevertheless ruled out by the
wording of the policy and the contractual arrangements between
Imperial Oil, Wellman-Lord and Commonwealth?
De Grandpr6 J. answered both questions in favour of
Commonwealth. He noted particularly that the commercial function
of such insurance, known as a "Builders' risk policy", was to
guarantee funds to rebuild in the event of loss without complex
questions of liability which might necessitate long litigation when
so many parties were participating in a major project.
A county court case in Ontario, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Partridge,46 looks at first innocuous enough, but may prove to be a
very disturbing development.
Diane Partridge owned and insured an automobile which, with
her consent, her husband regularly drove. The automobile was
destroyed in a collision which resulted in a conviction of Mr.
Partridge under section 234 of the Criminal Code.
Section C of the policy contained an exclusion directed at just
such an eventuality, and Waisberg Co. Ct. J. noted that it would
have made more sense to bring action against Mrs. Partridge for
return of the money paid for the collision loss. To this one might
add that the simplest recourse of all for the insurer would seem to be
to refuse to pay for the collision loss.
In any event, Liberty Mutual paid Diane Partridge nearly $3,200
and claimed to be subrogated in this amount against her husband.
Waisberg Co. Ct. J. gave judgment for the insurer on the ground
that it was entitled to be subrogated against the person who caused
the loss.
Given that Mrs. Partridge could have been deprived of her
recovery by the exclusion clause, the result in the particular case is
not disturbing. However, the implications for other situations are
chilling. Judge Waisberg did not rest his judgment on the
misconduct of Mr. Partridge amounting to a breach of the policy. It
46. (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 16; 67 D.L.R. (3d) 603; [1976] I.L.R. 1-806 (Co. Ct.)
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will be very upsetting if this case presages a move by insurers to
claim subrogation in respect of collision loss against spouses,
children and sundry other drivers contemplated by both insured and
insurer at the time the policy is written. This would, in the majority
of cases, effectively deprive the insured of the very collision
insurance for which he has contracted and paid.
Lawton v. Dartmouth Moving & Storage Ltd. 47 is a Nova Scotia
case which involves a discussion of subrogation only collaterally.
Dubinsky J. held that a storage company was not liable for loss
caused to customers' furniture caused by a fire in the storage
company's premises. He then went on to note that the actions before
him were subrogation claims by the insurers of the owners of the
furniture, and that the settlement of the insurance claim seemed to
leave the owners with less than a full indemnity. Citing his own
review of section 100M(1) in Sheridan v. Tynes, 48 Dubinsky J.
gave the opinion that the subrogation right conferred on a fire
insurer by section 128(1). of the Insurance Act, while in some
respects different from the subrogation right at common law, was
like the common law right in that it did not arise until the insured
was fully indemnified.
Dubinsky J. is really dealing here with the competing claims of
insurer and insured to control the action against the third party. This
was the point which gave rise to several cases and led ultimately to
the addition of subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) to section 100M in
order to provide a legislative code in respect of automobile
insurance.
III. Automobile Insurance Cases
Several of the most interesting and most significant Nova Scotia
cases have involved automobile insurance. Canadian General
Insurance Co. v. MacKinnon and Wolfe v. Oliver, for example, are
of national importance.
1. Consent to Drive
In view of the importance of section 82(1) of the Insurance Act in
the general statutory scheme intended, so far as possible, to
guarantee an insurance recovery for the innocent victim of an
47. (1976) 64 D.L.R. (3d) 326 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
48. (1971), 4 N.S.R. (2d) 143; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 277; [1971] I.L.R. 1-441 (S.C.,
T.D.)
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automobile accident, it is no wonder that "consent to drive" has
become one of the most recurrent issues in insurance litigation.
82(1) Every contract evidenced by an owner's policy insures the
person named therein and every other person who with his
consent personally drives an automobile owned by the insured
named in the contract and within the description or definition
thereof in the contract against liability imposed by law upon the
insured named in the contract or that other person for loss or
damage,
(a) arising from the ownership, use or operation of any such
automobile; and
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or the death of any
person, and damage to property ....
Leaving aside theft of the insured car altogether, the variety of
situations which can give rise to questions of "consent to drive"
appears to be endless.
Some of the situations are common and can be disposed of
briefly. In Bosch v. Soares and Hatfield49 the insured's daughter,
Kathleen Soares, was driving her father's car with his consent.
During the evening she allowed her friend, Harold Hatfield, to drive
and he was involved in an accident.
The insured, Albert Soares, had never met Hatfield, and the
question of consent became a question of implied derivative consent
flowing in two stages from father to daughter and then to someone
he had never met. Mr. Soares' testimony as to the general
restrictions placed by him on his daughter's liberty to use the car
was rather vague, but Dubinsky J. held that, though Hatfield may
have thought he had proper consent to drive, Mr. Soares' consent
could not be implied without some evidence that he had at least
considered the question.
In Bennet v. Grant50 the insured, Susan Grant, had followed an
established practice of allowing Philip Hersey to drive her car. Miss
Grant asserted that she had restricted Hersey in his use of the car on
the day of the accident. However, Cowan C.J.T.D. found this
evidence too weak in the face of the established pattern and held that
Hersey was driving with Miss Grant's consent at the time of the
accident.
Judgment Recovet-y (N.S.) Limited v. London and Edinburgh
Insurance Company5 ' involves a fact situation in which the Court
49. (1974), 7 N.S.R. (2d) 531 (S.C., T.D.)
50. (1976), 22N.S.R. (2d) 156 (S.C.,T.D.)
51. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 602; [1976] I.L.R. 1-724 (S.C., A.D.)
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refused to imply consent even though there was some evidence to
support such an implication. Elmer Richardt was hired in Medicine
Hat as a spare driver for a tractor used by the owner, Irwin Neil, to
haul trailers of frozen foods. Their assignments took Neil and
Richardt to Toronto, Fort Erie, Dartmouth and ultimately
Lunenburg. Throughout the trip Richardt drove only with Neil
present.
In Lunenburg the two men spent an evening drinking and then
Neil departed with a girl leaving Richardt and another man in the
tractor with the key in the ignition. An accident occurred when
Richardt and his friend essayed a trip to Bridgewater to find an open
restaurant.
At trial, Richardt admitted that he had no express consent to use
the tractor on the night of the accident. The trial judge refused to
imply such consent and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Two months after this Court of Appeal judgment Cowan C.J.
heard a somewhat similar case involving common employment as
taxi drivers. Smith v. Gilbert52 must stand as convincing authority
of the primary importance of a clear direction from the insured
restricting use of the vehicle whenever a question of "consent to
drive" arises.
The insured, Ruth Wilson, operated a taxi business. James
Gilbert drove one of her cars with roof light 749, and Ronald Shaw
drove another with roof light 566. A number of persons gave
evidence of instructions from Miss Wilson that no one was to drive
a vehicle except the. driver with whom an arrangement for the
specific car had been made.
Shaw and Gilbert drove in car 566 to a lounge. An argument with
the management of the lounge led to a scuffle in which Shaw was
injured and taken into custody by the police. Shortly thereafter the
plaintiff was injured in a collision with car 566 while it was being
driven by Gilbert. According to Shaw, Gilbert had not requested the
keys; the inference was that they had fallen out of Shaw's pants
pocket at some stage.
In the course of a holding that Miss Wilson's insurer was not
obliged to respond to the plaintiff's claim, Cowan C.J. said,
It is probable that, by reason of the arrangement between Miss
Wilson and the drivers of the respective vehicles, she would be
responsible if one of them was involved in an accident, and was
52. (1975), N.S. unreported, S.H. 04266
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negligent in the course of his driving as a taxi driver. It is
apparent that, at the time in question, Gilbert was not so driving,
and that he was on a frolic of his own. He was not driving in the
course of his employment, or as a servant or agent of Ruth
Wilson, and therefore, she is not liable to the plaintiff.5
3
Immediately preceding this part of his judgment the Chief Justice
emphasized that neither Miss Wilson, nor anyone with her
authority, had given Gilbiert consent to drive car 566. Gilbert was
supposed to drive only car 749.
In the result, it is a little difficult to be sure whether Miss Wilson
and her insurer were exonerated because Gilbert was driving the
wrong taxi, or because he was driving if for his own purposes and
not in pursuit of her taxi business, or whether each reason might
suffice, by itself, to foreclose the plaintiff's action against Miss
Wilson and her insurer.
Earlier on the same evening Gilbert was slightly injured in an
accident with car 749 and was taken to Victoria General Hospital. If
he had been driven to hospital in car 749 by another of Miss
Wilson's drivers would the taxi have been off cover during that time
and for which of the two reasons above? In fact, Gilbert left his
wallet at the hospital and was taken back to retrieve it by Shaw in
car 566; if Shaw had at that stage been involved in an accident
would the insurer have escaped on the ground that Shaw was not
driving in the course of his employment?
This case raises a number of concerns about taxi operations.
Granting that Miss Wilson may have selected her drivers by reason
of superior driving records (Gilbert's two accidents in one night
notwithstanding), it makes excellent sense for her to prohibit loans
of the cars to friends, family members and sundry other borrowers.
However, should she and her insurer be able to shelter behind such a
restriction on use if one of her cars is driven, for taxi purposes, by a
driver of another vehicle selected for employment, no doubt, by
reason of an equally impressive driving record?
Given that taxi driving almost inevitably involves opportunity
and incentive to combine work and play, or at any rate the
likelihood that personal errands will frequently insinuate themselves
between assignments, to what extent should Miss Wilson and her
insurer be able to resist a claim arising from an accident which
occurs while the driver is "on duty" but in fact temporarily using
the car for a private purpose of his own?
53. Id. at 4
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Cowan C. J. ventured no comment on the result which would
follow if Shaw had caused an accident with car 566 while on his
way to or from the lounge with Gilbert. His Lordship emphasized
the fact that Gilbert was not driving in the course of his
employment. The same would have to be said of Shaw in the case I.
have hypothesized. Although there is nothing in the judgment to
indicate that Miss Wilson knew that her drivers used the taxis for
their own transportation to places of entertainment, there is equally
no indication of any instruction by her on the point, and no
indication that a trip to a Dartmouth lounge was at all remarkable.
A different commercial setting in which a problem of implied
derivative consent to drive can readily arise is illustrated by Sulyok
v. Carroll.154 A group of six visitors to Halifax wished to do some
touring. One, Robert Taylor, rented a car from Holiday Rent-a-Car
Ltd. The rental agreement provided that the Rentor (Holiday) would
provide an automobile liability insurance policy for the benefit of
the Renter (Taylor) "and others driving with Rentor's and Renter's
prior consent". The agreement also stipulated that the vehicle was
not to be used or operated "unless otherwise provided on the face
hereof, by any person other than the Renter".
On the face of the agreement appeared the particulars pertaining
to Taylor. A space for "alternate driver(s)" was blank. Holiday's
employee had not raised the question and, in any event, Taylor
expected to be the only driver although all six members of the group
were sharing the cost.
Taylor allowed another member of the group, Christine Carroll to
drive, and while she was driving there was an accident in which the
car was badly damaged and two other members of the group were
injured. Cowan C.J.T.D. held that Holiday's insurer, Lloyds of
London, must respond to the claim against Taylor by the two
injured passengers, but were not obliged to respond to the claims
against Miss Carroll.
He was urged to adopt the reasoning of two U.S. cases in which it
was said that car rental agencies and their liability insurers should
know that there is a high probability of the rental cars being driven
by persons not named and not authorized in advance, and that in the
public interest the car rental agency should be taken to have given
constructive consent to driving by such unauthorized drivers.
Cowan C.J. did not consider the reasoning in the two cases
54. (1977), 22 N.S.R. (2d) 126 (S.C., T.D.)
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applicable to Nova Scotia. He cited the Motor Vehicle Act, s.55,
which makes the owner of a rental vehicle jointly and severally
liable with the renter for damage caused by the renter or for damage
caused by anyone else permitted to drive the vehicle "with the
express or implied permission of the owner". In the case before him
there was no express permission from Holiday for Christine Carroll
to drive, and Cowan C.J. considered that there was no implied
permission.
Easily the most distressing of all the "consent to drive" cases is
Wolfe v. Oliver,55 a classic example of the notorious practice by
which young persons buy automobiles and cause them to be
registered and insured by a parent, and a dramatic illustration of the
inadequacy of our elaborate statutory scheme to protect traffic
victims.
David Oliver owned a 1970 Austin which he insured with the
Co-operative Fire and Casualty Company. Having been convicted
of impaired driving and lost his licence for 12 months, David
arranged for his parents to take over the installment payments on the
Austin. Although no change was made in the registration under the
Motor Vehicle Act, and no change was made in David's policy with
Co-op, the Austin was thereafter treated as belonging to David's
mother, Cleophas Oliver, and was not driven by David or the other
Oliver children.
Cleophas Oliver had her own policy with Co-operative Fire and
Casualty Company, originally issued in 1967 to cover a Toyota.
In 1972 David's licence was restored and he arranged to by a
1967 Ford, the purchase financed by Canadian Acceptance
Corporation. In order to obtain a much lower premium, David
arranged for his mother to register the Ford in her name, and she
caused the Ford to be added by endorsement to her policy with
Co-op. Mrs. Oliver and David both signed the chattel mortgage
taken by Canadian Acceptance.
The Ford was regarded by all members of the family as belonging
to David and was driven only once by Mrs. Oliver and once by her
husband.
David Oliver, driving the Ford, collided with David Wolfe and
inflicted $10,000 of damage on him. Wolfe sued both David Oliver
and his mother. Cowan C.J. found that Cleophas Oliver was an
55. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 313; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 380; [1975] I.L.R. 1-644, rev'g
(1973), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 338; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 669; [1973]1 I.L.R. 1-555 (S.C., A.D.)
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"owner" of the Ford within section 221 of the Motor Vehicle
Act, 56 but that she was not liable to Wolfe inasmuch as David
Oliver was not operating the car as her servant or agent. He had her
consent to use the car, indeed it was agreed that he should have sole
control and use of it, but he did not use it as her agent or servant and
the presumption raised by subsections (3) and (4) of section 221 of
the Motor Vehicle Act had been rebutted. Thus, Cowan C.J. gave
judgment for Wolfe against David Oliver but not against Cleophas
Oliver.
The next issue, of course, was whether David Oliver's liability to
Wolfe was covered, either under his own policy or under his
mother's policy with Co-op.
The insurer argued that the Ford was not insured under Mrs.
Oliver's policy, notwithstanding the endorsement purporting to add
it to the policy. The argument was that she was not the owner and
had no insurable interest to support a policy on the Ford. Cowan
C.J. reiterated his conclusion that Cleophas Oliver was the
"owner" of the Ford for the purposes of section 221 of the Motor
Vehicle Act. This obviously exposed her to potential liability in
respect of the use of the car, and, in His Lordship's view, gave her
an insurable interest. Moreover, having made herself responsible
for payment on the chattel mortgage, she had an interest in the
preservation of the Ford which represented the security for the loan.
The insurer's second argument was that David Oliver was not
insured by his mother's policy in that he was not a named insured,
nor was he within the extended cover provided by section 82(1)
inasmuch as he was not driving with his mother's consent. Rather,
he drove the Ford as of right as owner of it.
Cowan C.J. rejected this argument, interpreting section 82(1) to
apply unless the driver has taken the vehicle without the consent of
the named insured. Throughout, Mrs. Oliver had consented to the
arrangement concerning the Ford. While she might have been
unable to prevent David from using the Ford if she had wished, she
could have deleted the car from her insurance policy. In this sense,
she consented to his driving.
Cowan C.J. also held that David's liability was covered under his
own policy with Co-op which had been continued in force during
his licence suspension and was still in force at the time of the
accident.
56. R.S.N.S. 1967, c.191
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The insurer contended that the Ford was not covered under that
policy which described the insured vehicle in the following standard
form language:
AUTOMOBILE DEFINED
In this Policy except where stated to the contrary the words "the
automobile" mean:
(a) The Described Automobile - an automobile, trailer or
semi-trailer specifically described in the Policy or within the
description of insured automobiles set forth therein;
(b) A Newly Acquired Automobile - an automobile, ownership
of which is acquired by the Insured and, within fourteen days of
its delivery to him, notified to the Insurer in respect of which the
Insured has no other valid insurance, if either it replaces an
automobile described in the application or the Insurer insures (in
respect of the section or subsection of the Insuring Agreements
under which claim is made) all automobiles owned by the Insured
at such delivery date and in respect of which the Insured pays any
additional premium required; provided however, that insurance
hereunder shall not apply if the insured is engaged in the business
of selling automobiles;
(c) A Temporary Substitute Automobile - an automobile not
owned by the Insured, nor by any person or persons residing in
the same dwelling premises as the Insured, while temporarily
used as the substitute for the described automobile which is not in
use by any person insured by this Policy, because of its
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, destruction or sale;
(d) Any Automobile of the Private Passenger or Station Wagon
type, other than the described automobile, while personally
driven by the Insured, or by his or her spouse if residing in the
same dwelling premises as the Insured, provided that
(iv) such other automobile is not owned or frequently used by
the Insured or by any person or persons residing in the
same dwelling premises as the Insured;
(e) [deals with employees and partners]
(f) [deals with a trailer owned by the Insured]
(g) [deals with a trailer not owned by the Insured].
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Obviously, the Ford was not the "described automobile" in
paragraph (a) since David had not informed the insurer of its
acquisition, nor done anything to add it to his policy. As David
owned the Ford it was not within paragraph (c) or (d).
However, the Chief Justice held that the Ford was a
"newly-acquired automobile" within paragraph (b) in that it
replaced the 1970 Austin and, though its acquisition had not been
notified to the insurer, the accident took place four days after its
acquisition, well within the fourteen days prescribed for notifica-
tion.
In the result, although David Oliver was disentitled to any
indemnity by reason of his participation in a misrepresentation made
to the insurer, and by reason of having driven while impaired,
nevertheless Co-op was obligated, under both policies, to respond
to Wolfe's claim.
This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. Cooper
J.A., for the Court, expressed some doubt whether Cleophas Oliver
had any insurable interest to support a policy on the Ford, but did
not decide that question. He did decide that David Oliver was not
covered under her policy. The entire scheme concerning registration
and insurance was a sham, David had full control over the car and
its use, and Mrs. Oliver's knowledge of, and acquiescence in, this
scheme did not amount to express or implied "consent" within
section 82(1).
As to David's own policy, Cooper J.A. held that it did not cover
the Ford which was not within the definition of a "newly acquired
automobile" since it did not "replace" the described automobile.
David had parted with the Austin 18 months earlier and had owned
no car in the interim.
I will not dwell on the relative merits of the approaches to
interpretation of statutory and contractual language illustrated by
these two judgments in Wolfe v. Oliver. I think it might be
suggested that Cooper J.A.'s reading of "consent" and of
"replaced" is so strict as to be overly legalistic, but I prefer for the
moment a cruder analysis of his judgment.
Permitting myself the luxury of assuming a "man-in-the-street"
perspective (hopefully, if not on the Clapham omnibus, yet
endowed with some of that traveler's famous common sense), I
would summarize the result of Wolfe v. Oliver as follows:
(1) we have an elaborate scheme designed to provide insurance
protection for traffic victims;
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(2) the scheme involves strict liability for the insurer notwith-
standing serious misconduct by the insured. For example,
misrepresentation of the ownership and primary driver of the Ford,
and driving it while impaired afforded Co-op no defence against
Wolfe within the $35,000 minimum limits;
(3) Co-op had insured David Oliver who was accepted by it,
thus, as one of its insured persons;
(4) Co-op had also insured the Ford under Mrs. Oliver's policy,
thus accepting the Ford as one of its insured vehicles;
(5) the Ford was owned by either David Oliver, or his mother, or
both, and was driven by David;
(6) despite our careful statutory plan, and despite what appears at
first to be two policies issued by the same insurer covering the Ford,
the insurer had no liability to David Wolfe who was struck by a
drunken driver and left with some eight major scars on his face
which, among many other observations appearing in the medical
evidence, left him with an asymmetrical appearance.
The best that can be said of this case is that Wolfe's damages,
fixed at a little over $10,000, were nicely within the limits of the
statutory fund. Although Co-op was not liable to pay, Wolfe was
not without relief. The rest of us chipped in to help him out.
If all of this sounds more like demagoguery than careful legal
reasoning, the answer is that demagoguery seems called for. A
major statutory reform is desperately needed. This theme will be
developed in Part V.
2. Insurable Interest
The sort of situation described in Wolfe v. Oliver is capable of
endless variations and has, in fact, given rise to several cases in
Nova Scotia in recent years. Most of the cases involve both an issue
of "insurable interest" and an issue of "consent to drive".
One of the more recent cases was Somers and Somers v. Brow's
Estate. 5 7 Alphonsus Brow owned a 1967 Pontiac which he insured
with Co-op. He and his wife, Mary Brow, decided to buy a 1971
Pontiac. Because Mr. Brow had the regular use of a Power
Corporation truck, he said to his wife that "you might as well have
[the car] in your name". Thus it was arranged that Mrs. Brow sign a
conditional sale agreement with the car dealer, and the 1971 Pontiac
was registered in her name. The 1967 Pontiac was traded in and
57. (1977), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 121; sub nom. Co-operative Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Judgment Recovery (N.S.) Ltd., [1977] I.L.R. 1-861 (S.C., A.D.)
Insurance Law 371
valued at $1,500 against the price of the new car. Mrs. Brow had a
job and made all the payments on the loan, though her job was
seasonal and Mr. Brow provided an unascertained amount of the
money required to maintain the payments. The 1971 Pontiac was
covered under Mr. Brow's insurance policy by endorsement
substituting it for the 1967 Pontiac.
Mrs. Brow, driving the 1971 Pontiac, inflicted injury on Carin
and Frank Somers.
Co-op, an old hand at this game, argued that it was not obliged to
answer the claim inasmuch as Alphonsus Brow, its insured, was not
the "owner" and Mrs. Brow was not driving the car with his
consent. The issue of insurable interest did not really surface here as
it did in Wolfe v. Oliver and in several other cases, counsel for
Co-op apparently preferring to stay as close as possible to the
winning formula in the Court of Appeal in Wolfe v. Oliver.
Dubinsky J. distinguished Wolfe v. Oliver on the basis that
Alphonsus Brow made significant financial contributions to the
purchase of the car. His Lordship concluded that registration of the
car in Mrs. Brow's name was a matter of convenience, that
Alphonsus Brow was its beneficial owner, and that Mary Brow drove
with his consent. He therefore ordered Co-op to respond to the
claim.
The Court of Appeal, again speaking through Cooper J.A.,
accepted Dubinsky J.'s view that Wolfe v. Oliver could be
distinguished on the facts, and dismissed an appeal.
3. Minimum Limits
The central features of the Insurance Act provisions designed to
guarantee an insurance sum available to motor vehicle accident
victims, are the statutory minimum limits on liability insurance
policies, the judgment creditor's direct right of action, and the strict
liability provisions, all as set out in section 92 and section 98 as
follows:
92 (1) Every contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability
policy insures, in respect of any one accident, to the limit of at
least $35,000, exclusive of interest and costs, against liability
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, one or more
persons and loss of, or damage to, property.
98 (1) Any person who has a claim against an insured, for
which indemnity is provided by a contract evidenced by a motor
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vehicle liability policy, notwithstanding that that person is not a
party to the contract, may, upon recovering a judgment therefor
in any province or territory of Canada against the insured, have
the insurance money payable under the contract applied in or
towards satisfaction of his judgment and of any other judgments
or claims against the insured covered by the contract and may, on
behalf of himself and all persons having such judgments or
claims, maintain an action against the insurer to have the
insurance money so applied.
(4) The right of a person who is entitled under subsection (1)
to have insurance money applied upon his judgment or claim is
not prejudiced by
(a) an assignment, waiver, surrender, cancellation, or
discharge of the contract, or of any interest therein or of the
proceeds thereof, made by the insurer [sic; the word should
obviously be "insured"] after the happening of the event
giving rise to a claim under the contract; or
(b) any act or default of the insured before or after that
event in contravention of this Part or of the terms of the
contract; or
(c) any contravention of the Criminal Code (Canada) or
statute of any province or territory of Canada, or of any state
or the District of Columbia of the United States of America by
the owner or driver of the automobile;
and nothing mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) is available to
the insurer as a defence in an action brought under subsection (1).
(5) It is not a defence to an action under this Section that an
instrument issued as a motor vehicle liability policy by a person
engaged in the business of an insurer, and alleged by a party to
the action to be such a policy, is not a motor vehicle liability
policy, and this Section applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
instrument.
(11) Where one or more contracts provide for coverage in
excess of the limited mentioned in Section 92, then, except as
provided in subsection (12), the insurer may,
(a) with respect to the coverage in excess of those limits;
and
(b) as against a claimant,
avail itself of any defence that it is entitled to set up against the
insured, notwithstanding subsection (4).
If there is no insurer responsible to answer the victim's claim,
Insurance Law 373
then of course the victim has recourse to Judgment Recovery up to a
limit of $35,000.
The most important Canadian case on section 98(11) is Canadian
General Insurance Co. v. MacKinnon which was first decided by
Dubinsky J. four years ago and worked its way through the Supreme
Court of Canada two years ago.
Donald and Ellen MacKinnon were injured in a collision with a
car owned by David Coldwell and driven by Clifford Smith.
Coldwell's car was insured by Co-operative Fire and Casualty
Company. Smith had a policy with Canadian General Insurance Co.
Each policy was written for the statutory minimum limits, $35,000.
At the time of the accident both Smith and Coldwell (who was a
passenger in his own car) were in breach of the statutory policy
condition against impaired driving.
The total damages awarded the MacKinnons, against Smith and
Coldwell jointly and severally, was $63,000. Apart from the
defence of breach of policy condition, the total insurance available,
$70,000, would just nicely satisfy the judgment.
Section lOOL of the Insurance Act constitutes an owner's policy a
first loss insurance and any other cover excess insurance only.
Accordingly, as first loss insurer, Co-op paid the limits of its policy.
The balance of the claim, $35,000 ($28,000 for the MacKinnons
and $7,000 for the Nova Scotia Health Services and Insurance
Commission as a subrogated claim for hospital and medical services
rendered to the MacKinnons), was sought from Canadian General.
It was argued for that company most forcefully that section
98(11) allowed it to raise the defence of breach of policy condition.
The argument was that the statutory scheme established only one
"minimum limits fund" of $35,000. If there were no insurer, there
was a public fund of $35,000; if there were one insurer with policy
limits of $200,000 it was strictly liable for, and the victim thus was
guaranteed, only $35,000; the result should not be different, the
argument proceeded, because of the fortuitous element of two or
more insurers being involved.
At trial 58 Dubinsky J. held against the insurer on two grounds. He
did not think the Legislature intended any discrimination, so far as
availability of the standard defences was concerned, as between
"A" Insurance Company and "B" Insurance Company simply as a
result of one being designated the first loss insurer as a result of
58. MacKinnon v. Canadian General Insurance Co. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 541;
43 D.L.R. (3d) 310; [19741 I.L.R. 1-618 (S.C., T.D.)
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combining section 100L with a fortuitous set of circumstances
concerning who was driving whose car.
Dubinsky J.'s second ground, on which he preferred to rest his
judgment attempted to finesse the insurer's argument by resort to
very strict statutory interpretation.
His Lordship focused on the following language:
98 (11) Where one or more contracts provide for coverage in
excess of the limits. . . the insurer may,
(a) with respect to the coverage in excess of those limits;
and then noted that neither policy provided for coverage in excess of
the limits, as each was written only for the statutory minimum
limits. Thus, reading section 98(11) very strictly it did not apply to
the case.
Although, in the great Common Law tradition, this judgment
would have been sufficient to decide the matter before him,
Dubinsky J.'s judgment would have left the law in an unsatisfactory
state. His second ground of judgment would have left the
implication that Canadian General would be in a better position to
resist a claim if its policy were written for $100,000 than if it were
written for only $35,000.
One can imagine the sudden unpopularity, among insurers, of
$35,000 policies, and we should probably have seen a practice of
issuing policies with limits of $36,000.
The Court of Appeal affirmed,5 9 preferring the first ground of
Dubinsky J.'s judgment. Cooper J.A. said that section 100L
operated only to establish which policy was first loss insurance, and
that the question under section 98(11) was quite distinct. Under that
provision, all policies were treated equally and each might be
strictly liable up to the $35,000 limit.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, 60 but by the
narrowest possible margin, 5-4. The majority adopted the view
expressed by Cooper J.A. Excellent dissenting opinions were given
by Ritchie J. and Pigeon J.
Ritchie J. accepted the insurer's argument that the entire design
of sections 92, 98 and 100L was to create one guaranteed fund, with
limits of $35,000. Pigeon J. reached the same result, but by a
59. MacKinnon v. Canadian General Insurance Co. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 534;
46 D.L.R. (3d) 427; [19741 I.L.R. 1-619 (S.C., A.D.)
60. Canadian General hIsurance Co. v. MacKinnon, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 606; 13
N.S.R. (2d) 631; 61 D.L.RI (3d) 1; [1976] I.L.R. 1-715
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masterful analysis of the statutory language. Noting the plural verb
form "provide" in section 98(11) he concluded that it was
necessary to consider all policies together when asking the question
whether "one or more contracts provide coverage in excess" of
$35,000. He also read section 98(11) and section 100L(l) together
and concluded that, since the first loss policy would always cover to
a limit of at least $35,000, any excess cover should be conceded to
be "in excess of" the $35,000 contemplated by section 98(11).
4. Preservation of Third Party Claims
Subsections (4) and (5) of section 98 operate very broadly to
preserve the direct right of action conferred on a third party
judgment creditor, in the face of misconduct by the insured which
gives the insurer a defence as against the insured and would also
provide a defence to any third party action were it not for the saving
effect of these two subsections.
One example of the wide meaning given these provisions is the
firmly established line of cases construing section 98(5) to remove
the insurer's defence based on misrepresentation in obtaining the
policy, although section 98(5) says nothing clearly about
misrepresentation at all.
In Lane v. Young 6' Cowan C.J. has recently essayed a similarly
wide interpretation of section 98(4) (b). Avery Young owned a 1969
Pontiac covered under a policy issued by The Halifax Insurance
Company. He traded the Pontiac on a 1969 Ford, did not notify his
insurer of the event, and 20 days later collided with, and injured,
Rickey Lane.
The insurer denied liability to Lane on the ground that the Ford
was not covered under its policy. As Young and the insurer never
contracted concerning the Ford, this defence would be unassailable
were it not for the extended definition of "the automobile" in the
policy. Paragraph (b) of that definition brings into the meaning of
"the automobile" a newly acquired vehicle which replaces the
described automobile if its acquisition is notified to the insurer
within fourteen days of its acquisition.
Since no notification was given within the prescribed fourteen
days, the insurer argued that the Ford was not within the policy
definition. Cowan C.J. held that failure to give the notice
61. (1977), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 445; sub nora. Re Judgment Recovery (N.S.) Ltd. and
The Halifax hisurance Company, 20 N.S.R. (2d) 631 (S.C., T.D.)
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constituted an "act or default of the insured" against which section
98(4) (b) was designed to protect the third party claimant.
Quoting Monnin J. in Pascoe v. Provincial Treasurer of The
Province of Manitoba, 6 2 Cowan C.J. concluded that cover had
attached "automatically" to the Ford upon its acquisition and had
lapsed at the end of the fourteen days. He then relied on a recent
Supreme Court of Canada judgment, General Security Insurance
Company of Canada v. Highway Victims Indemnity Fund,63 which
held that the counterpart to section 98(4) in the Quebec Act saved
the third party's claim against just such a lapse. However, it is of
critical importance that the Quebec provision specifically prevented
the insurer from setting up against the third party "the causes of
nullity or of lapse that might be set up against the insured". Pigeon
J. noted the importance of this difference of language and
distinguished Pascoe on the ground that the Manitoba Act did not
protect the third party against "lapse".
Nova Scotia section 98(4) reads exactly as did the Manitoba
counterpart under which Pascoe was decided. General Security is
distinguishable from Lane v. Young in exactly the same way that
Pascoe was distinguishable from General Security.
The better view of what happened in Lane v. Young would appear
to be expressed in this extract from Tritschler J.A. in the Manitoba
Court of Appeal judgment in Pascoe:
• . . there was no default by the insured and no violation by him
of the provisions of the Act or the terms of the policy. If the
insured desired to take advantage of the policy's provision for
insurance in respect of a "Newly Acquired Vehicle" he was free
to do so in the manner prescribed. But he was not under an
obligation to do so.
. . . . it may be that he did not expect to keep the newly-acquired
vehicle for long and so decided that he would not bother to have it
insured; or he may have decided to have nothing more to do with
this insurer; or he may simply have forgotten. His reasons are
unimportant. Whatever they were, he was free to do as he pleased
and for any reason which seemed sufficient to him could elect to
take advantage or otherwise of the provision under consideration.
Just as any other motorist may decide to insure or not to insure or
may forget to insure, so also might this insured.
64
62. (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 300; 26 W.W.R. 640; [1958] I.L.R. 1-305 (Man.
Q.B.)
63. [1976]1 I.L.R. 1-785 (S.C.C.)
64. (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 234 at 238; 27 W.W.R. 393 at 397; [1959] I.L.R.
1-318 at 554 (Man. C.A.)
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This treatment by Tritschler J.A. of the problem arising from
substitution of vehicles is consistent with our treatment of similar
problems concerning freedom to insure and freedom to terminate or
forfeit insurance cover. So far as the Insurance Act is concerned,
there is no duty on a vehicle owner to insure; having insured, he
may terminate at any time immediately upon giving notice to the
insurer; he may allow his cover to expire; the insurer, by giving 15
days' notice can terminate the policy and get off the risk. In all of
these situations there is nothing to protect the claim of a third party
victim. There being no duty on the insured to insure, or to maintain
his insurance, it does not seem persuasive to characterize conduct
like that of Avery Young as an "act or default . . . in
contravention" of the Insurance Act or the insurance contract.
Cowan C.J. was motivated, quite reasonably, by policy
considerations. The Halifax Insurance Company was content to
insure Avery Young as owner of a 1969 Pontiac. Trading for a 1969
Ford in no way affected the liability risk. When Young injured Lane
with his Ford why should the company escape liability for a claim it
could not have escaped if Young had inflicted the injury with the
Pontiac?
The answer seems to lie in the admittedly refined distinction
between breach of policy conditions and restrictive definition of the
risk assumed. Although this distinction is narrow, and difficult to
articulate entirely satisfactorily, its practical importance is dramatic.
The elaborate machinery of section 98, designed to preserve a third
party judgment creditor's claim against breaches which would
defeat a claim brought by the insured, is subject to the insurer's
right to select and define the risk it is willing to underwrite. This is
specifically recognized in the following language of section 98(1):
"Any person who has a claim against an insured, for which
indemnity is provided by a contract .... ,,65
The argument in Lane v. Young is that the insurer agreed to insure
a Pontiac; there was no agreement to insure a Ford; apart from the
policy's expanded definition of "the automobile" there would be
no possible ground for asserting that The Halifax Insurance
Company did insure the Ford; the case for saying that the Ford was
covered by Young's policy depends on showing total and literal
compliance with paragraph (b) of the expanded definition, including
notification of its acquisition within fourteen days.
65. Emphasis added.
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This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal which
dismissed an appeal from the judgment of Cowan C.J.66
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. noted that the Ford was "newly acquired by
the insured" and that it "replaced" the Pontiac described in
Young's policy. According to the Chief Justice that was sufficient
to bring the Ford within the cover. The fourteen day notice
requirement did not form part of the description of the vehicle and,
therefore, was not part of any restrictive risk definition.
The result of this case seems to be good public policy and the two
judgments illustrate creative judicial law-making. However, it
further exacerbates the rococo structure of section 98, already so
riddled with judicial apertures and so encrusted with judicial
embellishments. A complete redrafting of section 98 appears
urgently overdue.
IV. Legislative Developments
This is a very short Part. There is very little to report.
Apart from enactment of the Health Services and Insurance Act
6 7
to streamline the delivery of hospital and medical services, there has
been very little legislative activity concerning insurance in the past
four years.
Among a number of specific, narrowly-focused, amendments one
deserves mention. For many years the automobile insurance
legislation in all the common law provinces contained subrogation
provisions in the form now found in section lOOM (1) and (2),
lOOM (1) An insurer who makes any payment or assumes
liability therefor under a contract is subrogated to all rights of
recovery of the insured against any person and may bring action
in the name of the insured to enforce those rights.
(2) Where the net amount recovered whether by action or on
settlement is, after deduction of the costs of the recovery, not
sufficient to provide complete indemnity for the loss or damage
suffered, the amount remaining shall be divided between the
insurer and the insured in the proportion in which the loss or
damage has been borne by them.
A spate of litigation under these provisions concerned the relative
claims of insurer and insured to have carriage of the action against
the third party. The courts consistently held that, unless fully
indemnified by the insurer, the insured retained, as at common law,
66. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 107(N.S.S.C., A.D.)
67. S.N.S. 1973, c.8
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the right to carry the action, control its conduct, and compromise
the claim, subject to his duty of due diligence and good faith in
favour of the insurer. 68
The insurance industry was not content with the situation. In the
new uniform automobile insurance Part69 the following additional
subsections were added to section lOOM:
100M (3) Where the interest of an insured in any recovery is
limited to the amount povided under a clause in the contract to
which Section 100A applies, the insurer shall have control of the
action.
(4) Where the interest of an insured in any recovery
exceeds that referred to in subsection (3) and the insured and the
insurer cannot agree as to
(a) the solicitors to be instructed to bring the action in the
name of the insured; or
(b) the conduct and carriage of the action or any matters
pertaining thereto, or
(c) any offer of settlement or the apportionment thereof
whether action has been commenced or not; or
(d) the acceptance of any money paid into court or the
apportionment thereof; or
(e) the apportionment of costs; or
(f) the launching or prosecution of an appeal,
either party may apply to the Supreme Court for the
determination of the matters in question and the court shall make
such order as it considers reasonable having regard to the
interests of the insured and the insurer in any recovery in the
action or proposed action or in any offer of settlement.
(5) On an application under subsection (4), the only parties
entitled to notice and to be heard thereon are the insured and the
insurer, and no material or evidence used or taken upon the
application is admissible upon the trial of an action brought by or
against the insured or the insurer.
(6) A settlement or release given before or after action is
brought does not bar the rights of the insured or the insurer, as the
case may be, unless they have concurred therein.
These additional provisions were designed as a small code to
68. See, Kellar v. Jackson, [1962] O.W.N. 106 (H.C.); Cleveland v. Yukish,
[1965] 2 O.R. 497; 51 D.L.R. (2d) 208 (Co. Ct.); Sheridan v. Tynes (1971), 19
D.L.R. (3d) 277; [1971]I.L.R. 1-441 (N.S.S.C.,T.D.)
69. Enacted as S.N.S. 1966, c.79, but proclaimed January 1, 1969 as an
amendment to R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148
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govern the problems concerning carriage of the action. Obviously,
the design, as indicated by subsections (3) and (4), was to give
control of the action to the insurer whenever the insured was fully
indemnified except for a deductible portion under his policy, and in
all other cases the parties were to have the opportunity to apply to
the Supreme Court to settle disagreements concerning the matters
listed in subsection (4).
Unhappily, in Nova Scotia subsection (4) was enacted with a
typographical error causing it to refer to itself in a nonsensical
fashion. Even more unfortunately, the draft Uniform Part contairied
a typographical error by which subsection (4) referred to subsection
(2), a reference equally otiose and nonsensical, though not nearly as
obviously so until the provisions and their history and purpose are
carefully analyzed and understood.
In most of the provinces the error was detected and the new auto
insurance Part was enacted correctly with subsection (4) containing
a reference to subsection (3). In some of the provinces the error was
not detected and was enacted consistently with the Uniform Part.
However, those provinces later discovered the error and amended
subsection (4) to cause it to refer to subsection (3).
In Nova Scotia, having made our own unique typographical
error, it required seven years after enactment, and four years after
proclamation, to obtain a correction to subsection (4). By S.N.S.
1973 c.40, subsection (4) was amended cause it to refer to
subsection (2)! There it sits today, a meaningless reference which,
at least potentially, nullifies the statutory code to regulate disputes
between insurer and insured concerning control of the third party
action.
After eleven years we are in step with the draft Uniform Part,
which was wrong. After how many years may we expect to get it
right?
At the moment, it appears that there will be no amendment until a
case arises which causes some minor scandal. After some insurance
company, or some individual, has suffered inconvenience and cost
to obtain a judicial admonition about the error in the Act, we may
get a correction.
V. Reprise: What to do While Waiting for Nirvana?
Several provinces have enacted no-fault insurance plans to provide
protection for traffic accident victims. Nova Scotia studied no-fault
and has done nothing about enacting it.
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I am not at all sure Nova Scotia should adopt a no-fault approach.
What is crystal clear, however, is that our present scheme to protect
traffic accident victims contains so many large holes that it looks
like a piece of Swiss cheese.
The Motor Vehicle Act forbids anyone from driving a vehicle
unless either the vehicle or the driver is insured. 70 This prohibition
is flouted. Vehicle licences and drivers' licenses are issued by mail
without any attempt at checking on insurance. Unless he has an
accident, the only hazard facing the uninsured driver is the remote
chance that a policeman will ask him to show proof of insurance.
Even this can be finessed. It is notorious that some persons take
insurance, obtain the pink card which represents proof of insurance,
and then cancel the policy. The insubstantial pink card will then
probably suffice to protect against the normal police inspection.
Apart from the few cases in which a vehicle owner or driver has
been required to file a certificate proving financial responsibility
(after a conviction or an uninsured accident), insurance companies
are not required to notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of
termination or lapse of insurance cover. The abuse of pink cards
could be reduced if insurers were obliged to give such notice.
Another notorious practice is the one illustrated by Wolfe v.
Oliver. To obtain a lower insurance premium, the purchaser of a
vehicle procures its registration by a parent or spouse or, at any rate,
someone in a more favourable rating category. The "owner of
convenience" then buys a policy of insurance which is likely to
benefit nobody except the insurer. In a situation like Wolfe v. Oliver
the real vehicle owner has no protection, and his victim has no
claim against the insurer. The arrangement is not entirely without a
beneficiary; the insurer collects a premium.
Two legislative changes appear desirable. Section 221 of the
Motor Vehicle Act could be altered to enlarge the liability of a
person like Cleophas Oliver. It is only reasonable to exonerate
vehicle owners from responsibility for injury done by a thief or
someone using the owner's car truly in defiance of the owner's
wishes. It is neither reasonable nor satisfactory to exonerate a
nominal owner who is trying to assist in an insurance fraud.
A second solution to the same problem would be a statutory
extension of the meaning of "consent" for the purposes of section
82(1) of the Insurance Act. We are willing to read section 98(5) as
70. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191. See, s.205A as added by S.N.S. 1970, c. 53
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involving the insurer in strict liability notwithstanding that it was
induced by misrepresentation to issue a policy. It would be no more
unreasonable to give a larger definition to "consent to drive".
An increasingly critical deficiency is the low figure established as
the statutory minimum liability limits and the ceiling on recovery
from the public fund. At a time when responsible drivers are
questioning whether $300,000 is adequate cover, $35,000 is risible.
It is true that Nova Scotia is far from alone. Most Canadian
provinces still prescribe limits of $35,000. This simply means that
as inflation bounds ahead, life and limb grow cheaper in other
provinces as well. Since this is being written in Nova Scotia, I will
content myself with suggesting that at least in Nova Scotia the
minimum limits should be raised. Limits of $50,000 for example,
would have made the dispute in MacKinnon far less significant.
One of the recurrent themes in insurance litigation involves the
impaired driver. Ontario has removed its counterpart to Statutory
Condition #2(1) (a) and #2(2) (a) so that impaired driving may no
longer be pleaded as a defence under the liability cover, though the
insurer is permitted to insert an exclusion which prevents the
insured from recovering anything in respect of damage to his own
vehicle. Several other provinces have followed Ontario's lead.
On balance, I am not sure that Ontario's move is a desirable one
to follow. However, I think the problems illustrated by the cases
discussed in Part III, and the acute problems identified above in this
Part, suggest that some significant amendment to the Insurance Act
provisions governing automobile liability insurance, and to the
Motor Vehicle Act is urgently required if we aspire to a sound,
reliable, humane plan for the protection of traffic accident victims.
